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Abstract
In [9], a version of the Preˆt a` Voter verifiable election scheme [2]
using ElGamal encryption and enabling the use of re-encryption mixes
was presented. In order to ensure that the construction of the ballot
forms mesh with the re-encryption mixes, it was necessary to draw
the seed values from a statistical distribution, e.g., a binomial. In
this paper we present a similar construction of the ballot forms but
using Paillier encryption in place of ElGamal. The advantage of this
is that the homomorphic properties of Paillier are ideally suited to our
construction and removes the need to constrain the distribution of seed
values.
As with the scheme of [9], we have a distributed construction of en-
crypted ballot forms. This enables on-demand decryption and printing
of the ballot forms and so eliminates the need to trust a single authority
to keep this information secret. It also avoids chain of custody issues
as well as chain voting style attacks identified in [8].
1 Introduction
The Preˆt a` Voter scheme, first presented in [5] and [6] and elaborated in [2],
is a cryptographic voting scheme that enables voter-verifiability: at the time
of casting their vote, voters are provided with an encrypted receipt which
enables them to check, via a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB), that their
receipt is accurately included in a verifiable anonymising tabulation process.
Various checking mechanisms serve to detect any corruption in any phase
of this process: encryption of the vote (more precisely, in the case of Preˆt a`
Voter, in the construction of the ballot forms), recording and transmission of
the encrypted ballot receipt and the decryption and tabulation of the votes.
∗University of Newcastle
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Full details can be found in [2]. Henceforth we will refer to this version of
the scheme as Preˆt a` Voter’05.
Preˆt a` Voter’05 [8] uses RSA encryption and a layered construction for
the ballot form onions and decryption mixes at the tabulation stage. In [9]
this was adapted to use ElGamal encryption in place of RSA enabling the
use of re-encryption mixes in place of decryption mixes. This provides a
number of advantages, such as separation of mix and decryption phases,
easier recovery in the event of faulty mix tellers or corruption detection
during the audit phase and so on.
The special representation of the receipts in Preˆt a` Voter as a pair of an
index value and an encrypted term, means that they cannot be put directly
through a re-encryption mix, unless we are prepared to leave the index values
unchanged through the mix. Invariant index values would of course allow
an observer to partition the mix. In the case of Preˆt a` Voter’05, there was a
natural way to transform the index values as the terms moved through the
mix as a function of the germ values revealed at each stage.
The resolution of this problem suggested in [9] is to encrypt the seed
values as exponents rather than as pure terms in order to allow the index
value to be absorbed into the onion term. This results in a pure ElGamal
term that can now be put through a conventional (robust) re-encryption
mix. The drawback of this approach is that the raw votes appear in the final
decryption as exponents and so if unconstrained seed values are used, we
would have to solve the discrete log problem in order to extract the votes.
This was avoided by constraining the seed values to a suitable statistical
distribution, i.e., a binomial. This renders the decryption tractable whilst
avoiding edge-effects that might compromise secrecy in some instances if the
seed values where simply bound to an interval.
In this paper we explore the use of Paillier encryption in place of ElGa-
mal. This has the advantage that the homomorphic structure of Paillier is
ideally suited to our purposes and we are able to sidestep the obstruction
described above and so relax all constraints on the choice of the seed values.
We note also that in a recent paper [1], Adida and Rivest propose a
“Scratch and Vote” scheme that uses Paillier encryption, but for a different
purpose, i.e., to allow homomorphic tabulation.
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Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
X
7rJ94K
Figure 2: Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
We recall the key ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme. The key innovation
of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is, to encode the vote in a randomised frame of
reference, i.e., a randomised candidate list. Other schemes require that the
vote value be communicated to a device which then encrypts the value. Preˆt
a` Voter thus has the advantage that the device does not learn the voter’s
selection and so the threat of various side channels and subliminal channels
is neatly sidestepped.
At the polling station, voters are assigned (or choose) at random a ballot
form, and example of which is shown in Figure 1. Note that the order of
the candidates shown on any ballot form is random and unpredictable.
In the booth, the voter makes her selection in the usual way by placing
a cross in the right hand column against the candidate of choice, or, in the
case of a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system for example, they mark
their ranking against the candidates. Once the selection has been made, the
left hand strip is detached and discarded. The remaining right hand strip
now constitutes the receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
The voter now exits the booth with this receipt, registers with an official
and casts their encrypted receipt in the presence of the official. The ballot
receipt is placed against an optical reader or similar device that records the
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random value at the bottom of the strip and an index value indicating the
cell into which the X was marked. The physical receipt is digitally signed
and franked and this is retained by the voter retains as their receipt. The
independent randomisation of the candidate list for each ballot form ensures
the secrecy of the vote.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the “onion”, is the
key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value is the
information needed to reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the
vote value encoded on the receipt. This information is encrypted under the
secret keys shared by a number of tellers. Thus, only the tellers acting in
concert are able to reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the vote
value encoded on the receipt.
Once the election has closed, the digitized copies of the receipts are
transmitted to a central tabulation server which posts them to a secure
WBB. This is an append-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation
server, and later the tellers, can write to this and, once written, anything
posted to it will remain unchanged. Voters can visit this WBB and confirm
that their receipt appears correctly. If their receipt does not appear, or
appears incorrectly (i.e., with the X in the wrong position) they can appeal.
Note that, since they hold receipts, they have sound grounds for complaint
if their receipts fails to appear.
After a suitable period, the tellers take over and perform an anonymising
mix on the batch of posted receipts. Various mechanisms can be used to en-
sure that the tellers perform the decryptions correctly. These are described
in section 9.
3 Paillier encryption
Paillier encryption is a randomising algorithm that is ideally suited to adapt-
ing Preˆt a` Voter to re-encryption mixes. Key generation proceeds as follows:
firstly generate an RSA integer n = p.q and compute the Carmichael func-
tion of n: λ := lcm(p−1, q−1). Define L(x) := (x−1)/n. Find a generator
g of Z∗n2 such that g = 1 (mod n). (n, g) is published as the public key
whilst λ forms the secret key.
The encryption of a message m ∈ Zn is computed as:
c = gmrn (mod n2)
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Where r is a freshly generated random value drawn from Zn.
Decryption is given by:
m =
L(cλ (mod n2))
L(gλ (mod n2))
(mod n)
Due to the way that the payload is carried in the exponent, Paillier
enjoys the homomorphic property:
EP (a)⊗ EP (b) = EP (a⊕ b)
This makes Paillier ideally suited to our construction as it allows us to
absorb the index value of the receipt into the onion value.
4 Distributed generation of Paillier encrypted bal-
lot forms
We now present a mechanism for the distributed generation of the seed
values and ballot forms. Throughout, we use Paillier encryption.
The ballot forms will be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way
that each contributes to the entropy of the crypto seed and this remains
encrypted throughout. Consequently the candidate permutation, which is
derived from the final seed, remains concealed and all the clerks would have
to collude to determine the seeds values.
We assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares for a
threshold Paillier algorithm with Teller public key PKT : (n, α). These will
act much as the tellers of the original scheme and will be responsible for
the final decryption stage after the anonymising re-encryption mix phase.
Details of the anonymising and decryption/tabulation phases will be given
in section 7.
We also assume a set of Registrars with threshold secret key shares cor-
responding to the public key: PKR: (m,β). These public keys are known
to the Clerks and are used in the construction of the proto-ballot forms.
An initial clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds s¯0i drawn at random
from Zn. From these, C0 generates a batch of pairs of “entangled” onions
by encrypting each s¯0i under the Registrar key and the Teller key:
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({s¯0i }PKR , {s¯0i }PKT ).
Expressed in full as Paillier encryptions these have the form:
{(αs¯0i .(x0i )n), (βs¯
0
i .(y0i )
n)}
for fresh random values x¯0i , y¯
0
i drawn from Zn.
The remaining l− 1 Clerks now perform re-encryption mixes and trans-
formations on this batch of onion pairs. Each Clerk takes the batch of pairs
output by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along
with an injection of fresh entropy into the seed values. For each pair of
onions, the same entropy is injected into the seed value of both onions to
ensure that these values continue to match for each pair. The entropy will
be independent for each pair.
More precisely, for ith pair of the batch, the jth Clerk Cj generates a
fresh, random values x¯ji , y¯
j
i and s¯
j
i and performs the following mix/transformation
on each onion pair of the batch:
{(αsj−1i .(xi)n), (βs
j−1
i .(yi)n)}
↓
{(αsj−1i .αs¯ji .(x¯ji )n.(xj−1i )n), (βs
j−1
i .βs¯
j
i .(y¯ji )
n.(yj−1i )
n)}
↓
{(α(sj−1i +s¯ji ).(x¯ji × xj−1i )n), (β(s
j−1
i +s¯
j
i ).(y¯ji × yj−1i )n)}
↓
{(αsji .(xji )n), (βs
j
i .(yji )
n)}
where
xji = x
j−1
i × x¯ji
yji = y
j−1
i × y¯ji
sji = s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i
Having transformed each onion pair in this way, the Clerk Cj then per-
forms a secret shuffle on the batch and outputs the result to the next Clerk,
Cj+1.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of pairs of onions of the
form: (αsi .(xi)n), (βsi .(yi)n) where:
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xi = xli , yi = y
l
i , si = s
l
i
or:
si =
l∑
j=0
s¯ji (mod n)
xi =
l∏
j=0
x¯ji (mod n)
yi =
l∏
j=0
y¯ji (mod n)
We will refer to the first onion as the “Registrar onion” or “booth onion”
and the second onion as the “Teller onion”.
For each pair, assuming correct behaviour of the clerks, the s values in
the two onions will match. We’ll discuss mechanisms to detect corruption
of the forms in section 8. As the seed values, and hence the candidate
orders, remain encrypted, none of clerks knows the final seed values and
they would all have to act in collusion to determine the final seed values.
These encrypted forms can now be stored and distributed in encrypted form,
thus avoiding the chain of custody problems mentioned above.
5 On-demand creation of ballot forms
The above construction of the “proto-ballot” forms means that the ballot
form material can be stored and distributed with the candidate orders in
encrypted form. For example, forms might be pre-printed with the onion
pairs printed at the bottom, one at the bottom of each column, see Figure 3.
The booth device needs to be able to decrypt the left hand onion, or
to obtain a decryption by invoking a threshold set of the registrars. Thus,
we could arrange for the LH onion to be encrypted under a key held by
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Figure 3: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
the booth device. Alternatively, if vesting such keys in the booth device
is considered too fragile, the booth device could communicate the onion
value to an appropriate set of registrars who hold threshold keys who then
return the seed value to the device. All of this would need to be done over
suitably protected channels. From the seed value the device can derive the
candidate order using the publicly agreed function from the seed space to the
permutation space and print this onto the ballot form to give a conventional
Preˆt a` Voter ballot form.
Note that we should prevent the booth device from learning the RH
onion value, that will constitute the receipt onion. This is to avoid the
device learning the association of the receipt onion and the candidate order.
It may be possible to use a scratch strip mechanism to conceal the RH onion,
along the lines of suggested in [8]. This would only be removed at the time
of the supervised vote casting.
6 Supervised casting of a ballot
The voter now has a “conventional” Preˆt a` Voter style ballot form with the
candidate list and the associated right hand (Teller) onion. In the booth,
the voter marks her choice with an X against her candidate. The left hand
strip, that carries the candidate order and the LH onion, is detached and
discarded and the voter leaves the booth with the RH strip that constitutes
the receipt. Note that the RH onion is automatically discarded in this
process. The voter now registers with an official and casts their vote in
the presence of the official exactly as described previously. Their receipt is
recorded digitally as (r, onionR), where r is the index value indicating the
position of the X. The receipt can be digitally signed and franked at this
point to counter receipt faking attacks.
Once the election has closed, copies of the digitised receipts will be posted
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to the WBB exactly as before and the voters can visit this and assure them-
selves that their receipt has been correctly registered. In addition to this, a
Verified Encrypted Paper Audit Trail mechanism could be deployed: at the
time of casting, an extra paper copy of the receipt is made and retained by
the returning officer for example. This can be used to independently check
the correspondence with the receipts posted to the WBB, see [7].
7 Re-encryption/tabulation mixes
The construction above leads to Paillier onions which can be put through
re-encryption mixes. However, the form of the ballot receipts means that
this is not quite straightforward: in addition to the onion term we have the
index value, in the clear as it were. An obvious approach would be to send
the receipt terms through the mix re-encrypting the onions whilst leaving
the index values unchanged. The problem with this is that an adversary
is able to partition the mix according to the index values. There may be
situations in which this is acceptable, for example large elections in which
the number of voters vastly exceeds the number of voting options. In general
it seems rather unsatisfactory.
A more satisfactory solution, at least for the case of a simple selection
of one candidate from the list, is described in this section. We will discuss
how to achieve full mixing in the more general case in section 10.
In this case we restrict ourselves to just cyclic shifts from the base order-
ing of the candidate list from a base ordering. For single candidate choice
elections, this is sufficient to ensure that the receipts do not reveal the voter’s
selection. For more general styles of election, in which for example voters
are required to indicate a ranking of the candidates, we of course need to
allow full permutations of the candidate list. Indeed, even in the case of
single selection elections, it is preferable to allow full permutations in order
to eliminate any possibility of a systematic corruption of votes. For the
moment we discuss the approach of simple cyclic shifts.
Suppose that si is the seed for the ith ballot and let si (mod m), where
m is the number of candidates, be the shift of the candidate list. We can
absorb the index value r on the ballot receipt into the onion:
{r, (α−s.yn)} → (αr.α−s.yn) = (αr−s.yn)
Note that, for convenience, we encrypt −s rather than s. This gives a
pure Paillier term and the plaintext value r−s which, taken modulom, gives
9
the voter’s the original candidate choice in the base ordering. These Paillier
terms can now be sent through a conventional re-encryption mix by a set
of mix tellers, see for example [3]. These mix tellers do not hold any secret
keys but read in a batch of Paillier terms from the WBB, re-encrypt each
of them and then post the resulting terms in random order to the WBB.
After an appropriate number of such anonymising re-encryption mixes, (a
threshold set of) the decryption tellers take over to extract the plaintext
values.
8 Auditing the Ballot Forms
The mechanisms described above allow for the distributed generation of
ballot forms, just-in-time decryption of the candidate list and printing of the
ballot forms. This has clear advantages in terms of removing the need to
trust a single entity to keep the ballot form information secret and avoiding
chain of custody issues. On the other hand, it means that we can no longer
use the random pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms as suggested in [2].
Consequently, we must introduce alternative techniques to detect and deter
any corruption or malfunction in the creation of the ballot forms in the
booth.
The voter is furnished with two or perhaps more encrypted ballot forms.
All of these are decrypted by the device and the candidate orders printed
on them. The voter selects just one at random to cast her vote, the other
will be audited and discarded. Care has to be taken to avoid introducing
dangers of double voting or chain voting etc. The double sided forms of [4]
provide a possible mechanism to keep a clear account of the distribution of
ballot forms. Here, each side of a form carries an encrypted “proto-ballot”.
The LH onions on both sides are decrypted by the device in the booth and
the candidate orders printed on the appropriate sides. This results in two
independent ballot forms being generated, one on each side of the form. The
voter selects one side to vote and the other for audit. The forms actually
have a third, blank column opposing the candidate list on the other side.
Thus, detaching the candidate list on one side, the side chosen for voting,
detaches the blank column of the flip side, so leaving an intact form for
audit.
Auditing of the ballot forms could take place at several natural points in
the process: immediately at the time of casting, or just after using devices
provided by independent organisations. Additionally, auditing could take
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place on material posted to the WBB. All the information on both sides of
the receipts would be posted to the WBB. The the voted and audit sides
should be posted to separate regions of the WBB in such a way as to loose
any association between the two sides. The voted sides would be processed
via the tabulation mixes whilst the audit sides could be verified by anyone.
A variant of the Adida/Rivest off-line auditing mechanism, [1], could be
employed here: at the time of printing, audit information is also printed on
the LH strip of the ballots. In the case of ElGamal or Paillier encryption this
would be the randomising factors used in the encryption of the RH/receipt
onion. This information would be discarded for voted sides of the receipts
but preserved on the audit sides, so allowing auditing without the need to
invoke the tellers. Details of this approach will be written up separately.
9 Auditing the Anonymising Mixes
In order to detect any malfunction or corruption by the mix tellers, we can
again use the Partial Random Checking approach of [3]. Here the checks on
audited links will be slightly different to those of Preˆt a` Voter 2005: rather
than revealing the seed information for the layer in question, the teller is
required to reveal the re-randomisation factor used to re-encrypt the link
selected for audit.
Auditing of the decryption tellers is quite straightforward as we don’t
need any further mixing at this stage (the anonymising mixes will be enough
to ensure ballot secrecy). The correctness of the decryptions can thus be
directly checked by simply encrypting the final values with the public keys
and checking that these agree with the initial terms.
10 Handling full permutations and STV style elec-
tions
In order to deal with full permutations of the candidate list it is not imme-
diately clear how to generalise the approach of section 7.
One solution is simply to have one onion for each candidate position.
For a single candidate selection the ballot receipt would in effect simply be
the onion value against the chosen candidate. This feels rather inelegant
and inefficient in that it multiplies the number of onions required.
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For a ranked voting method, in which the voters are required to place
a rank against each candidate, a ballot receipt would now comprise n pairs
of rank value and onion. Each of these pairs could be put through the
mix separately with the rank value unchanged (allowing the adversary to
partition the mix according to the rank values seems not to matter). This
approach works fine as long as the voting method does not require a voters
rankings to be kept grouped for tabulation, as with STV for example.
11 Conclusions and Future Work
We have described the adaptation of Preˆt a` Voter 2006 to use Paillier en-
crytption in place of ElGamal. This appears to retain all the advantages
of Preˆt a` Voter 2006 whilst leading to a more straightforward construction
of the receipts compatible with the re-encryption mixes at the tabulation
stage.
It remains to find a completely satisfactory way to handle full permuta-
tions of the candidate list in the re-encryption mix. In addition, we intend
to explore alternatives to Partial Random Checking [3].
We also intend to explore ways to counter the possibility of colluding
entities establishing a link between the receipt onion and the decrypted can-
didate list. in the current scheme, it is possible for the final ballot creation
clerk and the booth device to collude to establish this link. Performing a
final re-encryption of the receipt onion at the time of casting is a possible
avenue, but introduces an extra complication to the protocol that would
require careful evaluation.
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